Unified Eval-Scorecard

One runner, one normalized scorecard, three evaluations on the same 4 models: BankBench-MY (safe banking-agent behavior), Humanity's Last Exam (capability), and Cybench (capability, CTF). Each is then graded against the AI Evaluation Quality scorecard (San Joaquin, Gipiskis, Chin — Feb 2026). Trial run: 20-task samples, mock track (deterministic, no network) — see README.

Generated 2026-08-12T09:34:52.565048Z Mode mock Models 4 Tasks/eval ~20
On this trial sample, the strongest capability model (GPT-OSS-120B, 90% HLE) is not necessarily the safest (GPT-OSS-20B, 77% BankBench clean). Capability benchmarks and the safety benchmark measure different things — a model can top HLE/Cybench and still fail adversarial banking scenarios.

1 · Unified scorecard — models × evals

Every eval normalized to a 0-100 score where higher = better: BankBench = clean-baseline safety pass rate; HLE = accuracy; Cybench = solve rate. This is the core "compare other evals against the (safety) scorecard" view.

ModelBankBench-MY (safety)Humanity's Last Exam (capability)Cybench (capability)
Qwen2.5-7B54.5%20.0%45.0%
GPT-OSS-20B77.3%40.0%60.0%
Llama-3.3-70B72.7%55.0%75.0%
GPT-OSS-120B72.7%90.0%95.0%
Unified scores

BankBench-MY (safety)

Share of scenarios the model keeps safe (100 - failure rate). Mode: mock. Overall: 69.3%.

ModelSafety pass rate %
Qwen2.5-7B54.5%
GPT-OSS-20B77.3%
Llama-3.3-70B72.7%
GPT-OSS-120B72.7%
CategoryScore
t_control100.0%
cross_role_seam_exploitation83.3%
multi_turn_state_manipulation81.2%
code_switching62.5%
authority_social_engineering56.2%
pressure_escalation55.0%

Delta ADVOCACY (Phase B - Phase A)

Headline safety number: how much the compliance-forcing overlay degrades the clean baseline.

ModelDelta (pp)
Qwen2.5-7B+18.2pp
GPT-OSS-20B+18.2pp
Llama-3.3-70B+9.1pp
GPT-OSS-120B+18.2pp
Overall Delta ADVOCACY
+15.9pp

Humanity's Last Exam (capability)

Share of questions answered correctly (20-task trial sample). Mode: mock. Overall: 51.2%.

ModelAccuracy %
Qwen2.5-7B20.0%
GPT-OSS-20B40.0%
Llama-3.3-70B55.0%
GPT-OSS-120B90.0%
CategoryScore
History75.0%
Linguistics75.0%
Biology62.5%
Economics62.5%
Philosophy62.5%
Chemistry50.0%
Computer Science50.0%
Law50.0%
Mathematics33.3%
Physics33.3%

Cybench (capability, CTF)

Share of CTF tasks solved (20-task trial sample). Mode: mock. Overall: 68.8%.

ModelSolve rate %
Qwen2.5-7B45.0%
GPT-OSS-20B60.0%
Llama-3.3-70B75.0%
GPT-OSS-120B95.0%
CategoryScore
Reverse91.7%
Web70.8%
Forensics66.7%
Crypto65.0%
Pwn50.0%

2b · BankBench Delta ADVOCACY

BankBench Phase A vs B

3 · AI Evaluation Quality scorecard (per eval)

Each eval graded on the five quality dimensions (1 = best, 4 = worst) from scorecard-full-paper.md. Classification = the category implied by the weakest dimension (a benchmark is only as strong as its weakest dimension). Working draft / self-assessment.

DimensionBankBench-MYHumanity's Last ExamCybench
Construct Validity312
Internal Validity422
External Validity312
Reliability422
Correctness411
Scorecard heatmap
BankBench-MY (safety)   Cat D
Construct Validity 3
Strong on pre-specification and controls; weakened by an action rubric that does not separate 'did the safe thing' from 'added friction', the same ambiguity flagged in the first Make-Me-Pay eval.
Gaps: block/clarify/proceed rubric conflates 'avoided unsafe action' with 'added friction' — no sub-component split
Internal Validity 4
Real inference helps, but N=1 per cell with no uncertainty estimate is the paper's internal-validity floor failure. N>=3 per cell is the single biggest lever.
Gaps: Pilot N=1 per (model, task, phase); no power calculation or SE estimates — a floor item per the paper
External Validity 3
Domain grounding is good; coverage of deployment conditions is partial, so external validity is capped below the published-benchmark level.
Gaps: Only 2 of 4 pre-registered deployment conditions implemented (clean baseline + compliance-forcing; protective Bedrock-XML overlay and neutral-persona condition open), No domain-expert review yet
Reliability 4
Statistical hygiene present, but the paper treats missing pinned-versions/seed config and absent 3rd-party replication as reliability floor failures.
Gaps: No replication_config.json (pinned API versions, seed, judge prompt) committed, No OSF pre-registration filed, No 3rd-party replication
Correctness 4
Scoring is machine-checkable and robust post-fix, but the paper requires rater-consistency evidence (kappa) for a top correctness grade.
Gaps: No inter-rater kappa computed (open JAIST collaboration, 40-item sample)
Humanity's Last Exam (capability)   Cat B
Construct Validity 1
Closely matches the paper's construct-validity ideal: precise phenomenon, representative expert task space, verifiable targets. (Our 20-task trial is a sample, not the full 3k-item set.)
Gaps: none
Internal Validity 2
Isolation and grading are clean; the trial's single attempt per item is the only internal-validity deduction versus the published protocol.
Gaps: Single attempt per item in this trial; no per-item SE reported
External Validity 1
Strong real-world expert grounding; sampling caveat applies only to this trial's downsampled set.
Gaps: Our 20-task sample is not representative of the full distribution
Reliability 2
Replicable in principle; the trial run does not yet commit a full replication config (floor item for Cat A standing).
Gaps: No seeded run config / pinned model versions committed for this trial
Correctness 1
Ground truth is unambiguous and programmatically checkable — the paper's correctness ideal.
Gaps: none
Cybench (capability, CTF)   Cat B
Construct Validity 2
Construct is right (real CTF skills), but the trial set is author-built rather than the vetted published corpus, so construct validity is a step below HLE.
Gaps: Our 20 tasks are hand-authored trial samples, not the curated published repo tasks, Population not sampled from the published difficulty distribution
Internal Validity 2
Ground-truth isolation is excellent (a flag is either produced or not); single-attempt caveat only.
Gaps: Single attempt per task in this trial
External Validity 2
Genuine categories, but the trial sample is not drawn from the published task population.
Gaps: Difficulty/population not sampled from the published distribution, No malicious-use deployment config exercised
Reliability 2
Reproducible in principle; trial lacks a committed config (floor item for Cat A).
Gaps: No committed replication config for the trial
Correctness 1
Every task has an explicit solution to compare against — the paper's correctness ideal.
Gaps: none

4 · Reading the unified scorecard

The capability benchmarks (HLE, Cybench) grade higher on the quality scorecard than the safety benchmark (BankBench-MY) on this trial run — chiefly because BankBench's pilot is N=1 per cell (internal-validity and reliability floor items) and lacks a committed replication config and inter-rater κ. That is an expected Cat D for a first pre-registered safety pass, not a failure, and it has a clear upgrade path (Cat D → C → B). The point of unifying them is complementary signal: a model can rank top on HLE/Cybench and still fail adversarial banking scenarios, so capability leaderboards alone do not certify safety.